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Abstract: The research paper presents an assessment of key budgetary 
and socio-economic indicators to reveal the effects of the models of public 
finance management adopted by the countries on the Balkan Peninsula. Based 
on these indicators, the analysis determines the fiscal stance of each Balkan 
country before, during and after the global economic crisis. The results of the 
analysis show a significant degree of similarity in the discretionary measures 
taken, but at the same time some more pronounced deviations from the general 
economic development of the Balkans.  
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iscal policy is a set of actions related to specific solutions to achieve 
certain political, social and economic goals and objectives. In economics, 
the central government’s fiscal policy has three main functions: to 
allocate, to distribute and to stabilize. They are associated not only with the 
efficient distribution of goods and resources, but also with the distribution of 
income and the management of certain macroeconomic and social processes 
aiming to achieve higher employment levels (respectively lower unemploy-
ment rates), price stability, and sustainable economic growth.  
F 
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Regardless of its objectives, every particular model of public finance 
management must be subjected to adequate quantitative and qualitative 
assessment. The subject of this study is fiscal policies of the Balkan states. Its 
object is the assessment of the effects of the fiscal policy and the analysis of 
certain quantitative (fiscal) indicators. These indicators are combined into a 
framework for fiscal monitoring and assessment of the sustainability of each 
country’s public finance. The aim of the study is to assess the fiscal stance of 
each Balkan state. This paper comprises several sections. The first part 
discusses the importance of fiscal policy and the tools to assess its effects. 
Section 2 presents a methodological framework for assessing the fiscal stances 
of the Balkan countries. Section 3 presents a quantitative assessment of the 
effects of the discretionary measures of the Balkan governments for the period 
2004-2018. The last part summarizes the main findings and conclusions 





According to Popa & Codreanu (2010), the role of any fiscal policy is 
determined mostly by the degree of the country’s economic development. 
While developed countries focus their efforts on maintaining full employment 
and stable economic growth, developing countries’ fiscal policies aim to 
stimulate investments, accelerate growth, minimize social inequality, raise the 
level of employment, and achieve price stability by means of appropriate fiscal 
levers. On the other hand, Zahariev & Dimitrov (2015) point out that 
governments often seek to achieve only short-term goals given the limited 
political horizon of their mandates and their aspirations for purely political 
gains on the forthcoming elections.  
In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis which 
occurred in the first decade of the 21st century, the pressure for strict 
monitoring of fiscal policy and measuring of its impact has been increasing. 
Such a monitoring requires a system of indicators which would most accurately 
measure its impact. International research and expert practice uses a wide range 
of indicators to monitor the effects and consequences of fiscal policy. 
Chouraqui, Hagemann & Sartor (1990) define four main groups of indicators 
for assessing fiscal policy, each targeted to the following aspects: the 
discretionary element in fiscal policy, the sustainability of fiscal policy, the 
aggregate demand impact of fiscal policy, and the allocational consequence of 
fiscal policy’s distribution function. Gramlich (1990) points out that the 
selection of fiscal indicators should take into account the control of aggregate 
demand, government debt management and microeconomic efficiency. 
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The applicable toolbox is based on certain budget indicators adopted by 
the IMF (International Monetary Fund Data), which include: overall budget 
balance (BB), primary budget balance (PBB), cyclically adjusted budget 
balance (CAB), cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB), total 
budget revenue (TREV) and total budget expenditure (ТЕXP).  
The cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) and the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB) are used by many countries world-
wide to measure their fiscal stance (FS) as part of the monitoring over their 
governments (Boije & Fischer, 2006). These indicators measure the effect of 
the government’s discretionary measures on both the current and the future 
management of public finance (Pattnaik, Raj & Chander, 2006). While most 
financial indicators are analyzed and assessed in terms of their relation to the 
actual GDP, the cyclically adjusted indicators are analyzed in terms of potential 
GDP (PGDP). The reason for applying this methodological measure is due to 
the assumption that the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) shows the 
budget balance of an economy in equilibrium, i.e. in which production has 
reached its potential level. Subtracting the cyclical part of the budget balance 
(CB) from the actual budget balance (BB) leaves a measure of the CAB, i.e. 
shows the budget balance which is formed mainly as a result of government’s 
measures rather than the balance caused by changes in the economic cycle. The 
cyclical component in the budget balance in practice reflects the activity of the 
so-called automatic budget stabilisers.  
CAB =  BB –  CB 
Various methodological approaches are used to calculate the cyclically 
adjusted budget balances (CAB and CAPB). These approaches differ mainly in 
terms of the degree of disaggregation of the data they use.  
 
 
Methodological framework of the research 
 
Regardless of the approach we have chosen, one of the first steps is to 
estimate the output gap (OG), i.e. the deviation of the actual GDP of the Balkam 
countries from their potential GDP (PGDP).  
OG =
GDP −  PGDP
PGDP
 
Within the EU, the deviation from the potential level of the economy is 
an important indicator that underpins the subsequent budgetary adjustments 
that each country must make. Its determination requires an additional 
calculation of the value of potential GDP (PGDP). There are two approaches to 
estimate the potential GDP: using the production function and using the filter 
of Hodrick-Prescott (1997). This research is based on the second approach, i.e. 




{𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 {∑ (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡)2𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 + 𝜆𝜆∑ [(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) −𝑇𝑇−1𝑡𝑡=2
(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1)]2}, 
where: 
λ is the smoothing parameter, λ>0. 
The second step is to determine requires determining the fiscal impulse 
(FI), i.e. what actions are taken by each government of the countries in the 
Balkan region within the analysed period. The aim of this step is to assess the 
actual impact of these actions on the fiscal system, excluding the actions of the 
so-called automatic budget stabilizers (i.e. changes in the values of the 
indicators caused by the economic cycle). The methodological framework 
requires to calculate the so-called cyclically adjusted values.  
The cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) is the difference between 
the cyclically adjusted budget revenue (TREVCA) and the cyclically adjusted 
budget expenditure (TEXPCA). This common approach is based on the IMF 
methodology (Fedelino, Ivanova & Horton, 2009): 
CAB = TREVCA −  TEXPCA 
The calculation of the cyclically adjusted budget revenue and 
expenditure is based on the actual budget revenue and expenditure adjusted 
with the elasticity of revenue (εTREV,OG)  and expenditure (εTEXP,OG) times the 
output gap, i.e. 
TREVCA =  TREV ∗  �PGDP
GDP
�εTREV,OG 
TEXPCA =  TEXP ∗  �PGDP
GDP
�εTEXP,OG  
To determine the elasticity of revenues and expenditures to the 
deviation of economic development from its potential, an econometric 
technique was applied with regression equations using the least squares method 
(LSM). The values of the variables are taken in logarithmic form, using the first 
differences. ∆ln �TREV
PGDP
� =  α + εTREV,OG ∗ ∆ln � GDP
PGDP
�+ μ ∆ln �TEXPPGDP� =  α + εTEXP,OG ∗ ∆ln � GDPPGDP� + μ, 
where: 
α is the constant term; 
μ is a random component. 
In order to calculate the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
(CAPB) we have to eliminate the impact of interest expenditure (IEXP) on the 
budh=get balance. 
CAPB =  CAB +  IEXP 
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The change of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance to 
potential GDP ratio (CAPB/PGDP) for a given period (e.g. a year, a quarter, a 
month) from a previous period is referred to as fiscal impulse (FI): 
FI =  
CAPBt−1
PGDPt−1 − CAPBtPGDPt  
In order to measure the actual fiscal stance of a country over a period 
(t), we need to take into account both the value of the fiscal impulse and the 
value of the output gap (as a measure of the deviation from the potential output). 
The results are usually presented graphically (see Figure 1) to assess the fiscal 
stance considering the indicator dynamics (Fitoussi & Saraceno, 2010). 
When the output if below its potential (OG<0), the government follows 
a restrictive fiscal policy thus increasing the CAPB (FI<0), which is considered 
a pro-cyclical stance (lower left quadrant), i.e. the government is raising the 
taxes and reducing its spending, which has a negative impact on the 
components of aggregate demand, and hence helps widen the recession gap. 
Conversely, when the output is below its potential (OG<0) and the government 
follows an expansionistic fiscal policy thus reducing the CAPB (FI>0), this is 
considered an anti-cyclic fiscal stance (upper left quadrant), i.e. the 
government is increasing its spending and decreasing its fiscal revenue in order 
to stimulate consumption and investments and thus to increase the output 








































FS OUTPUT GAP (OG) 
Source: Author’s figure based on Fitoussi & Saraceno (2010) 
Figure 1. Fiscal stance types (FS) 
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When the output if above its potential (OG>0) and the government 
follows an expansionistic fiscal policy thus reducing the CAPB (FI>0), this is 
considered a pro-cyclic fiscal stance (upper right quadrant), i.e. the govern-
ment is increasing its spending and decreasing its fiscal revenue, which 
increases the inflation gap and results in overheating of the economy. Con-
versely, when the output if above its potential (OG>0) and the government 
follows a restrictive fiscal policy thus increasing the CAPB (FI<0), this is 
considered an anti-cyclic fiscal stance (lower right quadrant), i.e. the 
government is raising the taxes and reducing its spending, which brings the 





A general overview of the fiscal indicators for the individual Balkan 
countries shows both some similarities and some serious differences among 
their national fiscal policies. This is why we undertook the task to assess the 
fiscal stance of each Balkan country using the methodology described above 
and annual statistical data for the period 2004 – 2018 published by their national 
statistical and financial institutions.  
Our calculations show that, with the exception of Greece, all Balkan 
countries reported a marked trend of GDP growth in the period 2004-2018. The 
GDP of most of these countries deviates significantly from its potential, i. е. 
they reported large output gaps. The greatest output gap was calculated for 
Turkey, but the OGs of Romania, Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia place them in the same group.  
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Table 1  
Output gaps of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Montenegro, Greece, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia (% of potential GDP) 
Year Turkey Bulgaria Romania Montenegro Greece Croatia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2004 32.97 -9.03 -8.08 -8.79 -10.23 -8.46 -6.35 
2005 19.33 -6.66 -8.27 -11.25 -8.05 -5.06 -7.60 
2006 13.29 -3.25 -4.54 -3.90 0.23 0.02 -1.54 
2007 5.74 5.18 5.18 9.10 7.03 6.27 4.37 
2008 1.91 11.91 20.22 16.59 11.79 11.08 12.07 
2009 -11.65 5.26 8.00 5.21 10.86 3.57 3.97 
2010 -10.84 0.98 -0.87 3.53 7.20 1.00 2.05 
2011 -6.38 3.87 -2.53 2.54 0.28 0.66 1.68 
2012 -7.53 0.83 -3.47 -4.92 -5.10 -1.66 -1.80 
2013 -6.02 -4.00 -3.36 -4.21 -7.99 -2.89 -2.96 
2014 -5.91 -5.97 -4.70 -6.04 -6.62 -4.29 -4.01 
2015 -4.05 -4.09 -4.66 -5.26 -5.01 -3.41 -2.87 
2016 -3.95 -2.19 -3.76 -2.18 -3.14 -1.78 -1.60 
2017 3.56 0.90 1.65 1.56 1.22 0.75 0.01 
2018 12.99 3.87 6.60 5.36 6.17 3.51 3.34 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
It is worth noting that of the seven countries in this group, only the 
Turkish economy has a reverse trend of development (i.e. an inflationary OG) 
in the period 2004-2006 compared to the other countries. At the same time, the 
global economic crisis affected the Turkish economy most seriously in the first 
years (2009-2010) with recessionary output gap exceeding 10% of the potential 
output level. In the other countries the recessionary output gap occurred at a 
later stage and increased incrementally.  
The second group comprises Albania, Serbia, Slovenia, North 
Macedonia and Kosovo. The economies in this group had significantly smaller 
output gaps. The economies of North Macedonia and Kosovo were nearest to 
their potential, especially between 2012 and 2018 (for Kosovo) and 2009 and 
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Table 2  
Output gaps of Albania, Serbia, Slovenia, North Macedonia, and Kosovo (% 
of potential GDP) 
Year Kosovo North Macedonia Slovenia Albania Serbia  
2004 4.50 -2.34 -6.15 -2.91 -7.74 
2005 -1.91 -1.44 -5.03 -3.50 -4.48 
2006 -6.48 -1.03 -1.20 -3.74 -1.38 
2007 5.44 2.58 6.28 -1.40 1.50 
2008 -0.23 6.83 11.35 2.90 5.57 
2009 -2.41 0.43 3.55 2.26 1.21 
2010 -1.08 0.03 1.34 4.71 -0.53 
2011 1.77 0.57 0.97 4.44 2.87 
2012 0.96 -4.02 -3.36 2.27 1.70 
2013 0.69 -1.87 -4.96 -0.61 3.74 
2014 -0.03 -1.80 -4.15 -1.15 -0.74 
2015 -0.70 -0.84 -3.46 -2.00 -2.14 
2016 -0.94 0.72 -2.25 -2.84 -2.13 
2017 0.09 0.07 1.39 -1.07 -1.61 
2018 0.55 2.04 5.13 0.99 0.47 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
The global economic crisis of 2007-2008 affected most of the Balkan 
countries. In the post-crisis years, most Balkan economies deviated from their 
potential level and reported a recession output gap, i.e. they performed below 
their potential. In 2017–2018, there was a tendency for economic growth of the 
Balkan countries to exceed their potential. Such a development must be 
carefully monitored and analysed as it could lead to overheating of these 
economies, soaring inflation levels, and new economic shocks.  
In order to assess the impact of fiscal policy and discretionary measures 
on the governments of the Balkan countries, we must exclude the effect of the 
economic cycle on the assessment indicators. The data in Table 3 show that in 
Slovenia and Kosovo public spending has low elasticity to the dynamics of 
economic development and output deviation from the potential level.   
 
Table 3  
Elasticity of budget revenue to output gap 
Country 𝛆𝛆𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓,𝐎𝐎𝐎𝐎 𝛆𝛆𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓,𝐎𝐎𝐎𝐎 Страна 𝛆𝛆𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓,𝐎𝐎𝐎𝐎 𝛆𝛆𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓,𝐎𝐎𝐎𝐎 
Bulgaria 1.23 0.66 North Macedonia 1.45 0.73 
Greece 0.55 0.70 Turkey 0.77 0.66 
Croatia 0.95 0.55 Serbia 0.89 0.85 
Romania 0.85 1.04 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.13 1.27 
Slovenia 0.81 0.18 Kosovo 0.85 0.07 
Montenegro 1.60 1.17 Albania 1.25 1.12 
 Source: authors’ calculations. 
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On the other hand, the revenues and expenditures of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania are highly sensitive to changes in 
economic development. Seven of the Balkan countries have inelastic budget 
revenues (Greece, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, Serbia and Kosovo), 
while data show that public spending is inelastic in eight of the countries 
(Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, North Macedonia, Turkey, Serbia and 
Kosovo). 
The results presented in Exhibit 1 show that most Balkan countries, 
including Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Romania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, pursued mainly restrictive fiscal policies in the period 2005–
2018, which is proved by their negative fiscal impulses. In the period 2005–
2009, the Bulgarian governments tried to accelerate the country’s economic 
growth through fiscal expansion. From 2010 to 2013, some more restrictive 
measures were introduced, which is typical for the EU countries as a whole in 
search of fiscal consolidation and addressing the emerging fiscal imbalances. 
In 2014, the fiscal policy was partially expansionary and in 2015 and beyond it 
was predominantly restrictive. 
Two the Balkan countries (Slovenia and Kosovo) consistently followed 
fiscal policies that were both expansionary and restrictive throughout the whole 
period. The other four Balkan countries (Albania, Serbia, North Macedonia and 
Turkey) pursued predominantly expansionary fiscal policies (i.e. FI>0.) The 
analysis can also be done by years, noting that 2005, 2010, 2015, 2016 and 
2017 were the years in which restrictive fiscal policies were predominant (i.e. 
most countries pursued this type of policy). In the first years of the global 
economic crisis (2007-2009), as well as in 2011 and 2018, most of the Balkan 
countries pursued expansionist fiscal policies. In 2006, 2012, 2013 and 2014, 
their policies included both expansionist and restrictive measures.  
The assessment of Bulgaria's fiscal stance confirms the above 
observation that in the first years of the period under review (2005-2006) the 
fiscal system relied on budgetary expansion. Although these are strong years 
for the Bulgarian economy, Figure 2 shows that the economy operated below 
its potential and was gradually approaching its potential through a counter-
cyclical fiscal stance, and after 2006 it even exceeded its potential.   
 




Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2. Bulgaria’s fiscal stance 
 
In the first years (2007-2009) of the global economic crisis, the country 
continued to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy, but the economy was already 
above its potential, which is why its fiscal stance is considered pro-cyclical. In 
order to “overcool” the economy and return it to its potential (keeping inflation 
at bay) as well as to consolidate public finance, the Bulgarian governments in 
the period 2010-2013 pursued a restrictive fiscal policy and from 2010 to 2012 
this policy was rather counter-cyclical given that the economy was above its 
potential, and in 2013 it was pro-cyclical.  
From 2014 to 2016, the economy was below its potential - in 2014 the 
government adopted a counter-cyclical expansionist policy while in 2015 and 
2016 - a restrictive pro-cyclical policy. In the period 2015-2016, government 
spending remained at and even below its 2014 level but the economy still 
performed with a positive real GDP growth and was approaching its potential 
level. In 2017 and 2018, the fiscal discretionary measures continued to maintain 
a positive growth of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (FI<0), 
although there was an increase in both budget revenues and budget 
expenditures.  
Greece is the Balkan country that was most severely affected by the 
economic crisis that occurred at the end of the first decade. From 2006 to 2011, 
the Greek economy was above its potential, with significant fiscal stimuli in 












































Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 3. Greece’s fiscal stance  
 
The country’s expansionistic fiscal policy further burdened the state 
budget by increasing the annual budget deficit. This in turn aggravated the 
fiscal, debt, financial, and political crisis in the country. Its economy collapsed, 
which is reflected in the dynamics of its GDP after 2010. To address the fiscal 
problems, the Greek governments in the period 2012-2016 signed international 
bail-out agreements undertaking to conduct fiscal consolidation of Greece’s 
public finance sector by reducing and restructuring the government spending 
as well as to undertake adequate reforms in the country's tax system in order to 
provide additional budget revenues. In 8 of the 14 years of the period under 
review, Greece's fiscal stance is counter-cyclical and its policy is predominantly 
restrictive, especially in the periods after 2008 and after 2015.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the Balkan countries with strong 
public sectors involved in their economic development measured in terms of 
the share of public revenues and public expenditures as a percentage of GDP.   
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 































































































From 2005 to 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a pro-cyclical fiscal 
stance, with the country's government generating sufficiently large budget 
revenues in 2005-2006 to cover the budget expenditures, but after 2006 there 
were additional fiscal stimuli, which resulted in budget deficits (Figure 4). The 
budget balance remained negative until 2014 due to a broadly pro-cyclical 
expansionist policy (high levels of government spending and insufficient 
budget revenues due mainly to the crisis) in the period 2007-2009 and a 
counter-cyclical expansionist policy in 2012 and 2013. In order to reduce the 
annual budget deficits, the government undertook certain reforms in the public 
sector (e.g. freezing/reducing wages), which aimed to keep public spending 
within a certain level with a tendency to gradually reduce it. At the same time, 
budget revenues are more constant over time. The ongoing fiscal consolidation 
improved the budget balance after 2014 and especially in 2015.  
Croatia is also one of the Balkan countries where the treasury has 
pursued a pro-cyclical policy for most of the period under review. In the period 
2005–2018, only in 2010 and 2017 did the country's fiscal position have a 
counter-cyclical character, with restrictive discretionary measures in place 
(Figure 5). The analysis of the fiscal position of Croatia gives the opportunity 
to form two sub-periods according to the actions of its government.  
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 5. Croatia’s fiscal stance 
 
From 2006 to 2011 (except in 2010), its pro-cyclical fiscal stance was 
accompanied by expansionary actions by the government, while from 2012 to 
2016, although the fiscal stance remained pro-cyclical, the policy pursued was 
restrictive, which was due to the excessive deficit procedure launched in the 
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The recommendations for structural reforms to improve the 
competitiveness of the Croatian economy and to curb macroeconomic 
imbalances, as well as the actions taken by the Croatian government, 
contributed not only to improving the budget balance but also to achieving 
significant economic growth after 2015. At the same time, there was a gradual 
decrease in unemployment in the country and especially in youth 
unemployment, where the youth unemployment rate was reduced by half in 




Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 6. Serbia’s fiscal stance 
 
The fiscal stances of Serbia, Romania and Kosovo are by and large 
similar to that of Croatia. The assessment of Serbia's fiscal stance for the period 
2005-2018 shows that the discretionary measures of its government are mostly 
pro-cyclical (2005, 2007-2012 and 2015-2018), whereas in certain years the 
fiscal impulse had positive values (i.e. a pro-cyclical fiscal stance through 
expansionary measures in the periods 2007-2009, 2011-2012 and in 2018), 
while in other periods the fiscal policy was restrictive.  
Figure 6 shows that in 2006 as well as in the period 2013-2014, the 
Serbian government opted for a counter-cyclical type of fiscal policy. 
Romania's public finance management policy is predominantly pro-
cyclical, but unlike the expansionist policy of Serbia, Romania's pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy is accompanied by fiscal restrictions (Figure 7), mostly in the 
period 2010-2015, when the fiscal impulse had negative values as a result of 
the gradually increasing cyclically adjusted primary budget balance. While in 
2010 the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance was in deficit of 30 billion 
Romanian lei, in 2014 the balance was relatively balanced and in 2015 there 
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2009 are largely due to the excessive deficit procedure which was launched in 
2009 and continued until 2013. Some of the recommendations of the European 
institutions, which were implemented by the Romanian government after that, 
were to balance the expenditure by freezing the salaries and social benefits in 
the public sector, as well as to look for different options to increase its budget 
revenue. (ЕС, 2013).  
Figure 7 shows that since 2015, the country has again adopted a looser, 
albeit at first glance countercyclical, fiscal policy, which in the coming years 
may create conditions for new shocks in the fiscal sector. The reason for this 
policy of fiscal incentives can be the frequent changes in the country's 
governance in the last years of the period under review and thereafter.  
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 7. Romania’s fiscal stance 
 
Kosovo's fiscal stance, albeit pro-cyclical for most of the period under 
review, is characterized by significant dynamics (Figure 8). In the period 2005-
2010, Kosovo's economy was quite volatile, performing both below and above 
its potential level. The fiscal impulse increased steadily until 2008, with the 
country moving from a restrictive to an expansionary fiscal policy.  
Since 2011, there were no serious deviations both in the output level 
(close to the potential) and in the government's fiscal measures. In the period 
2014–2016, restrictive measures are observed, although the economy 
performed below its potential. These measures are mainly associated with the 
postponement of a large share of capital expenditures (World Bank Group, 
2017) relative to the increase in current expenditures (mainly concentrated in 
the increase in labour costs and social expenditures). The fiscal impulse 
fluctuated within in a very narrow band of about 1 to 2 percentage points, which 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 8. Kosovo’s fiscal stance 
 
Slovenia's cyclically adjusted primary budget balance is much more 
balanced than those of the other countries. An exception to this conclusion is 
2013, when the country reported a large deficit as a result of fiscal actions taken. 
The balanced cyclically adjusted budget balance is also reflected in the value 
of the fiscal impulse, which ranges from -3 to +3 percentage points. However, 
Slovenia's economy was not quite stable over time, especially at the beginning 
of the global economic crisis. Figure 9 shows that during half of the period 2005 
–2018 Slovenia’s government pursued a restrictive fiscal policy, and during the 
other half - an expansionary one. Like most of the Balkan countries reviewed 
so far, the government of Slovenia also preferred a pro-cyclical fiscal stance.  
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 



















































































On the surface, Albania's fiscal policy is predominantly expansionist 
(Figure 10). The value of its CAPB/PGDP ratio, although negative during the 
analysed period, does not change rapidly, and this leads to a relatively lower 
value of its fiscal impulse.  
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 10. Albania’s fiscal stance 
 
The only more significant deviation in the value of the fiscal impulse 
was in 2010 and was due to shrinking government spending and increasing 
budget revenue, i.e. improving the value of the budget balance in 2010 
compared to the previous year. The deficits in the actual budget balance and the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance was halved, while the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance was even in surplus. In the fiscal position of Albania, 
as in most Balkan countries, there is an alternation of years with counter-
cyclical fiscal measures and years of pro-cyclical measures.   
Montenegro's economy developed rapidly in the period 2005–2008, 
reaching levels above its potential (Figure 11). With the onset of the global 
economic crisis, Montenegro's economy started overheating and its growth rate 
was decreasing gradually. During the crisis and in the first post-crisis years, the 
country followed a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Initially, this policy was 
expansionary, but the emerging and growing deficit leads to fiscal 









































Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 11. Montenegro’s fiscal stance 
 
In 2017, Montenegro's public spending was significantly higher 
compared to its level in 2016. This fiscal impulse can be seen as a positive 
factor for the country's economy, which in 2016 was below its potential, while 
in 2017 the trend was reversed. In 2018, the actual GDP of Montenegro was 
higher than the estimated potential GDP resulting in a positive output gap. The 
economy performed above its potential, but the country was already following 
a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, to prevent further overheating of its economy. 
North Macedonia is the Balkan country with the smallest spread of its 
fiscal impulse dynamics in the period 2005-2018. Except in 2008, when there 
was a pro-cyclical expansionary fiscal stance with a fiscal impulse of 3 
percentage points, its impulse fluctuated between -1 and +1 pp. throughout the 
whole period. However, the country has been generating persistent budget 
deficits since 2008, leading to an increase in its overall debt.   
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 





















































































Deficits were mainly due to discretionary measures of the government, 
and not so much to automatic budget stabilizers. The government's fiscal policy 
from 2007 to 2009 and from 2011 to 2014 was expansionistic. In 2010, 2011 
and 2017, the fiscal stance of North Macedonia was neutral. From the point of 
view of its fiscal stance in relation to the changes in the economic development, 
the data in Figure 12 show a balance in time, with a pro-cyclical stance in the 
period 2006-2009 and in 2015 and a counter-cyclical stance in 2005, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2016 and 2018. 
While the economies of almost all Balkan countries gradually shifted 
from performance below to performance above their potential during the first 
years of the analysed period, the trend in Turkey was reverse. In 2005 and 2006, 
Turkey’s economy performed far above its potential with a gradually declining 
growth rates and a significant decline of the country's economic development 
during the crisis. Despite the serious fiscal measures of the Turkish 
government, the resulting significant negative output gap in 2009 and 2010 is 
clearly seen in Figure 13.   
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 13. Turkey’s fiscal stance 
 
The country follows a predominantly expansionistic fiscal policy, with 
certain more drastic fiscal restrictive measures only in 2010 and 2011. After 
2011, the economy began to recover gradually towards its potential, but at a 
rather slow pace. Between 2011 and 2015, the Turkish government followed a 
fiscal policy that allowed a somewhat balanced budget balance to be 
maintained, with the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance covering 

















































The fiscal positions of the Balkan countries show some similarities over 
time, especially when it comes to the EU member states among them. 
Observing the supranational regulations of the EU for public finance 
management and financial sustainability, the latter took certain measures and 
implemented a number of reforms over the period to prevent further 
disturbances in the public sector. The other countries, which are not yet 
members but are potential candidates for accession to the EU, also tried not to 
deviate significantly from the imposed course of fiscal management set by the 
European institutions. However, during the global economic crisis and the post-
crisis years, certain deviations from the planned path of public finance 
management can be observed. The governments of some of the countries 
implemented some unusual measures which were based both on purely expert 
opinions, but also on purely populist reasons. Such measures can both 
contribute to improving the fiscal discipline and sustainability and aggravate 
the problems in the future, especially when combined with future local or global 
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Country Показател 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bulgaria 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 5.56 3.92 3.71 1.17 2008 -4.4 -2.62 -1.95 0.32 1.16 -3.17 0.12 1.41 1.74 1.83 
FI (p.p.)   1.63 0.22 2.54 0.08 4.47 -1.77 -0.67 -2.28 -0.83 4.33 -3.29 -1.29 -0.33 -0.09 
Greece 
CAPB/PGDP (%) -4.89 -2.22 -1.51 -1.59 1.09 -9.37 -4.49 -2.71 -4.11 -9.68 -0.28 -2.54 3.31 3.94 4.97 
FI (p.p.)   -2.66 -0.72 0.08 -4.39 4.98 -4.89 -1.78 1.39 5.57 -9.4 2.26 -5.86 -0.62 -1.03 
Croatia 
CAPB/PGDP (%) -1.6 -1 -1.5 -1.6 2.8 -4.5 -4.3 -5.4 -2 -1.7 -1.2 0.7 2.4 3.3 2 
FI (p.p.)   -0.62 0.5 0.13 -2.9 1.6 -0.21 1.1 -3.36 -0.28 -0.52 -1.88 -1.73 -0.91 1.37 
Romania 
CAPB/PGDP (%) -0.26 -0.19 -1.63 -1.69 3.62 -7.05 -5.48 -4.03 -2.18 -0.62 0.07 0.63 -1.41 -1.27 -1.33 
FI (p.p.)   -0.07 1.44 0.06 -3.41 3.65 -1.57 -1.45 -1.84 -1.56 -0.69 -0.56 2.04 -0.14 0.06 
Slovenia 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 1.43 1.6 0.47 -0.42 1.72 -5.59 -4.39 -5.05 -0.99 -10.16 -1.04 1.33 1.71 2.12 1.45 
FI (p.p.)   -0.17 1.13 0.89 -3.39 2.2 -1.2 0.66 -4.06 9.17 -9.11 -2.38 -0.38 -0.41 0.67 
Montenegro 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 1.47 1.39 5.16 5.43 2.96 -5.33 -3.15 -4.05 -2.63 -1.5 0.71 -4.75 -0.64 -2.42 -1.93 
FI (p.p.)   0.08 -3.76 -0.27 -2.5 2.83 -2.18 0.9 -1.42 -1.13 -2.21 5.45 -4.11 1.78 -0.49 
Northern 
Macedonia 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 1.73 1.43 2.06 1.12 7.93 -1.93 -1.74 -1.82 -2.06 -2.62 -2.91 -2.11 -1.87 -1.89 -0.39 
FI (p.p.)   0.3 -0.63 0.94 -0.93 1 -0.18 0.08 0.24 0.55 0.29 -0.79 -0.24 0.01 -1.49 
Turkey 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 7.92 7.52 7.54 5.54 2.05 0.28 1.51 2.85 2.33 2.29 2.1 2.31 0.73 0.01 -0.47 
FI (p.p.)   0.4 -0.02 2 3.63 3.34 -1.23 -1.34 0.52 0.04 0.19 -0.21 1.58 0.72 0.48 
Serbia 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 1.25 2.11 -0.02 -1.1 1.91 -3.45 -3.28 -3.32 -4.66 -2.86 -3.44 -0.46 1.7 3.64 2.78 
FI (p.p.)   -0.86 2.13 1.08 -2.01 1.45 -0.17 0.04 1.34 -1.8 0.58 -2.98 -2.16 -1.94 0.86 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
CAPB/PGDP (%) 1.67 2.43 3.19 1.9 0.91 -3.52 -1.78 -0.5 -1.38 -1.63 -1.47 1.38 1.98 3.28 3.13 
FI (p.p.)   -0.76 -0.77 1.29 -0.84 2.69 -1.74 -1.29 0.88 0.25 -0.17 -2.85 -0.6 -1.3 0.15 
Kosovo 
CAPB/PGDP (%) -6.42 -0.82 3.45 5.66 2.74 1.83 -0.79 -1.38 -2.33 -3.19 -2.33 -1.49 -0.92 -1.08 -2.71 
FI (p.p.)   -5.6 -4.27 -2.22 0.06 -1.77 2.62 0.59 0.95 0.86 -0.87 -0.84 -0.56 0.16 1.62 
Albania 
CAPB/PGDP (%) -1.35 -0.28 -0.5 -0.88 5.6 -3.88 0.31 -0.34 -0.32 -1.75 -2.3 -1.36 0.68 0.07 0.62 
FI (p.p.)   -1.07 0.22 0.38 -2.67 1.21 -4.19 0.65 -0.02 1.44 0.55 -0.94 -2.04 0.6 -0.55 
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